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Introduction to the
2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium:
Trolls or Toll-Takers: Do Intellectual
Property Non-practicing Entities Add Value
to Society?
Samuel F. Ernst*
There are few areas of patent law more contentious than the
dispute over the social utility of “non-practicing entities,” or
(if you will excuse the expression) “patent trolls.”1 Generally
speaking, patent trolls are companies that acquire patents, not
for the purpose of developing new technologies and creating jobs,
but for the sole purpose of demanding royalties (through
litigation if necessary) from those companies that do release
products on the market. Whether non-practicing entities add
value to society is a topic of much debate, and the focus of the
2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium.
On the one hand, there has been no shortage of
condemnation of patent trolls from the legal community. One
study reported that patent trolls imposed direct litigation costs
on defendants of $29 billion in 2011 alone.2 This stunning figure
does not even include the indirect costs of litigation (for example,
the cost of manpower directed away from useful activities when
engineers must assist in collecting discovery, giving depositions,
investigating non-infringement and invalidity defenses, and so
forth; and the jobs that could be preserved or created with the
money spent on defending litigation). Nor does this figure include
the substantial amount of royalties paid to patent trolls in
Assistant Professor of Law, Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of Law.
And some scholars will not excuse that expression. James F. McDonough argues
that the term “patent dealers” is a “[a] more suitable, market-contextual term for
nonpracticing patent owners who license or enforce their patents.” James F. McDonough
III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent
Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 201 (2006). Robin Feldman and her
colleagues prefer the term “patent monetization entities.” Robin Feldman, Tom
Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities,
UCLA J.L. & TECH., Fall 2013, at 1, 16.
2 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Essay, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes,
99 CORNELL L. REV. 387, 408 (2014).
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licensing negotiations to avoid the prospect of costly litigation.3
Robin Feldman and her colleagues estimate that patent trolls
filed 58.7% of the patent infringement lawsuits in 2012, and
observe that trolls frequently target startup companies in the
internet and technology sectors4—companies that are just
embarking on the path to innovation and cannot afford to defend
themselves even if the asserted patents are plainly invalid or not
infringed.
In this vein, commentators condemn patent trolls as “bottom
feeders” who acquire and assert low-value patents, calculating
that the high cost of litigation will result in an early settlement.5
Patent trolls are able to drive up the cost of litigation with
impunity. They can demand expensive discovery but are immune
to counterattacks because they produce no products that can be
the target of patent infringement counterclaims and have little
information to discover, given that they are small companies or
even shell corporations with little or no employees.
Indeed, whereas most areas of patent law are arcane and
abstract, patent trolls have failed to escape the attention of even
the President of the United States, who has complained that
patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves.
They’re just trying to essentially leverage and hijack somebody
else’s idea and see if they can extort some money out of them.”6
And condemnation of patent trolls appears to be one area on
which the two parties can agree. Vox reports that “[t]he incoming
Republican chairmen of both the House and Senate Judiciary
committees have signaled their support for patent legislation.
And they largely see eye to eye with President Obama, who has
also called for reform.”7 In support of such reforms, Senator Orrin

See id. at 409.
Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 1, at 13 (citing John R. Allison et al., Patent
Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶ 6); Colleen Chien, Startups and
Patent Trolls 1 (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at digitalcommons.
law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1554&context=facpubs.
5 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126 (2013). The authors identify two other varieties of patent
trolls: “lottery ticket” trolls own a patent they believe reads on a wide swath of technology
and hope to “hit it big” with a large jury award; “patent aggregators” collect many
thousands of patents and are able to force companies to take licenses without litigation
because it is infeasible and prohibitively expensive to defend against such a sheer number
of patents, regardless of whether they are valid or infringed. Id. at 2126−27.
6 Mike Masnick, President Obama Admits that Patent Trolls Just Try to ‘Extort’
Money; Reform Needed, TECHDIRT (Feb. 14, 2013), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/2013
0214/14351821988/president-obama-admits-that-patent-trolls-just-try-to-extort-money-ref
orm-needed.shtml.
7 Timothy B. Lee, Senate Republicans Are Getting Ready to Declare War on Patent
Trolls, VOX (Nov. 20, 2014, 8:30 AM), http://www.vox.com/2014/11/20/7251877/republicanpatent-troll-fight.
3
4

Do Not Delete

2015]

6/6/2015 10:50 AM

Introduction to the 2015 Symposium

613

Hatch recently said, “Patent trolls – which are often shell
companies that do not make or sell anything – are crippling
innovation and growth across all sectors of our economy.”8
On the other hand, some scholars have argued that the
criticism of patent trolls is misguided. James F. McDonough
forcefully argues that patent trolls (or patent dealers, as
McDonough calls them) benefit society by providing liquidity,
market clearing, and increased efficiency to the market for
patents.9 The evolution of an efficient market for innovation gives
inventors an incentive to invent and gives the public “easier and
broader access to inventions.”10 Hence, patent trolls help to
effectuate the goal of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, to “promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to
their . . . Discoveries.”11
In a wholly different vein, Mark Lemley and A. Douglas
Melamed argue that those who focus their energy on attacking
patent trolls are “missing the forest for the trolls.”12 While patent
trolls are a large and growing problem, they are merely
“a symptom of systemic issues the patent system faces in the IT
industry—too many patents interpreted too broadly, a remedy
system that routinely awards excessive damages and enables
patent holders to bargain for excessively costly settlements, and
an enormous royalty stacking problem.”13 Professor Lemley and
Mr. Melamed further argue that “[p]racticing entities, as well as
trolls, can and do take advantage of these issues.”14
The 2015 Chapman Law Review Symposium will seek to
advance the discussion of non-practicing entities in three
ways: (1) by expanding on the scholarly debate surrounding
patent trolls summarized above; (2) by expanding on the
perspectives informing this debate beyond academia by inviting
the views of practitioners from both sides of the patent troll
divide; and (3) by expanding on the scope of this topic by
considering the nature and possibility of copyright and
trademark trolls.
First, I will moderate a panel of distinguished patent law
scholars will expand upon and further develop the debate

8
9
10
11
12
13
14

Id. (quoting Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)).
McDonough, supra note 1, at 216–18.
Id. at 223.
U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
Lemley & Melamed, supra note 5, at 2121.
Id. at 2180.
Id.

Do Not Delete

614

6/6/2015 10:50 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 18:3

summarized above with new data and theories on the issue of
patent trolls:
– Professor Robin Feldman will assess the impact of patent
trolls on the business and legal landscape of the country
and consider common law, regulatory, and legislative
responses to the problem.15
– Professor Amy L. Landers will explore how patent trolls
are creating a “bubble” in the value of patents, the
bursting of which could have destabilizing, negative
consequences for investment in research and
development.16
– Professor Brian L. Frye will argue that we should stop
using intellectual property metaphors, such as “patent
troll.” These metaphors describe intellectual property as
an expression of moral values, which prevents us from
understanding the connection between intellectual
property’s theoretical welfarist justification and its actual
scope.17
– Professor Ryan T. Holte will analyze in detail the
Supreme Court case of eBay v. MercExchange, arguing
that the case is improperly understood as creating a firm
rule that non-practicing entities cannot obtain injunctive
relief; and that this misunderstanding was caused in part
by eBay’s marketing and public relations efforts and the
settlement of the case before the Federal Circuit could
render a final ruling on the case.18
Second, a distinguished panel of patent law practitioners and
policy makers will debate the effect of non-practicing entities on
industry. This panel will include:
– Congressman
Dana
Rohrabacher
of
California’s
Forty-Eighth Congressional District;
– Robert D. Fish, a partner at Fish & Tsang LLP, who
litigates patent cases;
– Lee Cheng, the Chief Legal Officer of the technology
company Newegg Inc.;

15 See Robin Feldman, The Pace of Change: Non-practicing Entities and the Shifting
Legal Landscape, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 635 (2015).
16 See Amy L. Landers, Private Value Determinations and the Potential Effect on the
Future of Research and Development, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 647 (2015).
17 See Brian L. Frye, IP as Metaphor, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 735 (2015).
18 See Ryan T. Holte, The Misinterpretation of eBay v. MercExchange and Why: An
Analysis of the Case History, Precendent, and Parties, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 677 (2015).
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– Ian D. McClure, the Director of Intellectual Property
Exchange International, Inc., a company that describes
itself as “the World’s First Financial Exchange for
Licensing and Trading Intellectual Property Rights;”19
Mr. McClure argues that NPEs have been essential in
the development of patent rights as an asset class and
article of trade, and that NPEs should next develop “best
practices” to provide greater transparency through a
central marketplace;20 and
– Nathan Shafroth, a partner at Covington & Burling LLP
who litigates patent cases.
– John B. Sganga, Jr., a partner at Knobbe, Martens, Olson
& Bear, LLP who litigates patent cases and teaches at
the Fowler School of Law, will moderate this panel.
Third, a distinguished panel of copyright and trademark
scholars and practitioners will expand this discussion to consider
the nature and existence of “soft IP” trolls:
– Professor Tom W. Bell will examine the emergence of
“copyright pornography trolls,” who sue thousands of
John Doe defendants with the hopes of netting millions
in settlement payments from the guilty and innocent
alike. Professor Bell will also examine the use of taxi
medallions to pursue networked transportation
companies such as Uber and Lyft. Professor Bell argues
that these types of vexatious conflicts result from the
mistreatment of statutory and regulatory privileges as
property rights.21
– Professor Michael S. Mireles will explore how trademark
law has addressed the problem of non-practicing entities
through laws and regulations in areas such as Internet
domain registration and Patent and Trademark Office
inter partes proceedings.22
– Chris Arledge, the Co-founder and Managing Partner of
One LLP, Brad Greenberg of Columbia Law School, and
Lindy Herman of Fish & Tsang LLP will also contribute

IPXI, https://www.ipxi.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2015).
See Ian D. McClure, From a Patent Market for Lemons to a Marketplace for
Patents: Benchmarking IP in Its Evolution to Asset Class Status, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 759
(2015).
21 See Tom W. Bell, Copyright Porn Trolls, Wasting Taxi Medallions, and the
Propriety of “Property”, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 799 (2015).
22 See Michael S. Mireles, Trademark Trolls: A Problem in the United States?, 18
CHAP. L. REV. 815 (2015).
19
20
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to this panel. It will be moderated by Professor Mary Lee
Ryan of the Fowler School of Law.
Finally, we are most honored to have Andrew Byrnes, Chief
of Staff of the United States Patent and Trademark Office as our
keynote speaker. Mr. Byrnes will discuss ongoing developments
relevant to patent applicants and owners, including
non-practicing entities, and the role of the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and the Obama Administration in helping to
ensure the IP system is balanced, effective, and promotes
innovation.23

23 See Andrew Byrnes, Chief of Staff, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Keynote
Address at the Chapman Law Review Symposium: Standing Sentinel over
Innovation: The Importance of a Balanced and Effective IP System (Jan. 30, 2015), in 18
CHAP. L. REV. 617 (2015).

